Limitation  of  Representation  in  the 
General  Assembly  of  Illinois 


An  Argument  Against  the  Proposal  Pending 
Before  the  Constitutional  Convention 


ISSUED  BY  THE  CITIZEN’S  COMMITTEE  FOR 
POPULAR  REPRESENTATION 

UHIVERSITY  OF  ILLIUeiS  LIBRAS? 

- —  .  - 1322 


CHICAGO.  JANUARY.  1922. 

OAK  ST.  HDSF 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 
in  2017  with  funding  from 

University  of  Illinois  Urbana-Champaign  Alternates 


https://archive.org/details/limitationofreprOOciti 


<L  L 

CITIZENS’  COMMITTEE  FOR  POPULAR 
REPRESENTATION 


AUGUSTUS  S.  PEABODY,  Chairman,  President  Citizens’  Association 
DR.  HERBERT  L.  WILLETT,  Vice-Chairman 

MRS.  CATHERINE  WAUGH  McCULLOCH,  Vice-Chairman 
HENRY  P.  CHANDLER,  Secretary 


EXECUTIVE  COMMITTEE 

F.  B.  JOHNSTONE,  President,  City  Club  of  Chicago 

MRS.  B.  F.  LANGWORTHY,  Vice-President,  Woman’s  City  Club 
HENRY  G.  ZANDER,  President,  Civic  Federation  of  Chicago 

WALTER  F.  DODD  MRS.  IRVIN  McDOWELL 

MRS.  MORRIS  LEIBER  JOHN  P.  McGOORTY 

GEORGE  C.  SIKES 


GENERAL  COMMITTEE 


WILLIAM  TRACY  ALDEN,  President,  Chicago  Bar  Association 
CLIFFORD  W.  BARNES,  President,  Chicago  Sunday  Evening  Club 
GEORGE  T.  BUCKINGHAM,  President,  Union  League  Club 
MRS.  L.  N.  FRENSDORF,  President,  League  of  Cook  County  Women’s  Clubs 
MRS.  EDWARD  GUDEMAN,  President,  Chicago  Woman’s  Aid 
JOHN  R.  MAGILL,  President,  Chicago  Real  Estate  Board 
JOSEPH  R.  NOEL,  President,  Chicago  Association  of  Commerce 
JULIUS  ROSENWALD,  Chairman,  Chicago  Bureau  of  Public  Efficiency 
MISS  GRACE  E.  TEMPLE,  President,  Chicago  Woman’s  Club 
MISS  CHARLOTTE  D.  WHITE,  President,  Illinois  Woman’s  Bar  Association 
FRED  M.  CLARKE,  Cook  County  Real  Estate  Board 
WALTER  A.  SHAW,  Western  Society  of  Engineers 


A.  M.  VAN  AUKEN,  Chicago  Chapter,  American  Association  of  Engineers 


HAROLD  ALMERT 

SENATOR  HENRY  W.  AUSTIN 

JOHN  DORR  BRADLEY 

FREDERICK  W.  BURLINGHAM 

REP.  HOWARD  P.  CASTLE 

GEORGE  E.  COLE 

MISS  GRACE  DIXON 

C.  A.  DYKSTRA 

C.  T.  B.  GOODSPEED 

AUGUST  GEWEKE 

MRS.  HOMER  A.  JONES 

JOSEPH  JOYCE 

MRS.  A.  E.  KALTENBRUN 

MRS.  M.  RICHARD  KULTCHAR 


ALBERT  KAKUSKA 

CORNELIUS  LYNDE 

GEORGE  B.  McKIBBEN 

MRS.  FRANK  MELLISH 

CHARLES  E.  MERRIAM 

MISS  HELEN  A.  MONTEGRIFFO 

CHARLES  D.  RICHARDS 

MRS.  LULU  SMART  SCHWEIZER 

SHELBY  M.  SINGLETON 

MRS.  BLAKE  C.  SMITH 

MRS.  HENRY  STRAUSS 

GRAHAM  TAYLOR 

S.  R.  WATKINS 


PREFATORY  STATEMENT. 


On  December  13,  1921,  a  conference  of  citizens  and  of  rep 
resentatives  of  citizen  organizations,  called  to  oppose  unfair 
limitation  of  representation  in  the  Illinois  Legislature,  was 
held  at  the  City  Club.  The  conference  by  resolution  expressed 
opposition  to  the  proposal  pending  in  the  Constitutional  Con¬ 
vention  to  limit  the  representation  of  Cook  County  in  both- 
Houses  of  the  General  Assembly.  The  chairman  of  the  meet¬ 
ing,  Judge  Charles  M.  Thomson,  was  authorized  to  appoint  a 
committee— called  the  Citizens’  Committee  for  Popular  Rep¬ 
resentation — to  bring  the  views  of  the  conference  to  the  atten¬ 
tion  of  members  of  the  Constitutional  Convention. 

The  unusual  array  of  organizations  represented  in  this  com¬ 
mittee  indicates  the  strength  of  the  sentiment  of  the  .citizen¬ 
ship  of  Cook  County  upon  the  question  of  limitation  of  repre¬ 
sentation.  It  is  rare  that  so  many  local  organizations  of  such 
varied  interests  can  be  brought  into  unity  upon  any  specific 
proposition.  The  fact  of  the  substantial  unity  of  Cook  County 
in  opposition  to  the  proposal  in  question  cannot  be  seriously 
challenged.  The  organizations  named  herein  as  opposed  to 
double  limitation  represent  large  membership,  and  in  several 
instances  the  sentiment  has  been  shown  by  direct  referendum 
vote  of  the  membership  to  be  overwhelmingly  hostile  to  the 
pending  limitation  proposal. 

The  accompanying  argument  is  respectfully  submitted  to 
the  Constitutional  Convention  with  great  confidence  that  it  is 
sound  in  principle  and  that  it  represents  the  views  of  the  j 
overwhelming  mass  of  the  citizenship  of  Cook  County. 

Augustus  S.  Peabody,  Chairman, 
Citizens’  Committee  for  Popular  Representation. 


LIMITATION  OF  REPRESENTATION  IN  THE  GENERAL 
ASSEMBLY  OF  ILLINOIS. 


Representation  upon  the  basis  of  population  has  always 
been  the  rule  in  Illinois.  Failure  of  the  General  Assembly  to 
reapportion  since  1901  has  created  a  distinct  inequality,  af¬ 
fecting  adversely  all  of  the  more  rapidly  growing  portions 
of  the  State. 

By  the  terms  of  the  Constitution  of  1870  the  State  is  divided 
on  the  basis  of  population  into  51  senatorial  districts,  each 
electing  one  senator  and  three  representatives.  This  constitu¬ 
tion  requires  a  reapportionment  every  ten  years  on  the  basis 
of  the  Federal  census.  Thus,  theoretically,  under  the  present 
constitution,  representation  in  both  houses  of  the  General 
Assembly  is  on  the  basis  of  population. 

However,  there  has  been  no  reapportionment  since  1901,  and 
the  situation  is  not  that  prescribed  by  the  present  constitution. 
At  the  present  time  there  are  51  senators,  and  of  these  Cook 
County  has  19.  There  are  153  representatives,  and  of  these 
Cook  County  has  57.  According  to  the  census  of  1920,  Cook 
County  would,  upon  the  basis  of  population,  be  entitled  to  5 
additional  senators  and  15  additional  representatives.  This 
failure  to  reapportion  as  required  by  the  present  constitution 
has  not  only  deprived  Cook  County  of  its  representation  in  the 
two  houses  upon  the  basis  of  the  present  constitutional  rule, 
but  has  also  deprived  Cook  County  of  its  proportionate  repre¬ 
sentation  in  the  Constitutional  Convention,  for  a  constitu¬ 
tional  convention  is  composed  of  two  delegates  from  each 
senatorial  district. 

Why  has  the  General  Assembly  failed  to  perform  its  con¬ 
stitutional  duty  of  reapportioning  in  1911  and  again  in  1921  ? 
Cook  County  has  been  steadily  growing  in  population  so  that 


6 


it  now  has  about  47  per  cent  of  the  entire  State’s  population. 
With  this  rapid  growth  there  has  developed  a  strong  feeling 
against  giving  Cook  County  the  additional  representation  to 
which  her  population  entitles  her  under  the  present  constitu¬ 
tion.  Prior  to  1901  there  was  little  feeling  against  represen¬ 
tation  in  both  houses  on  the  basis  of  population,  and  reap¬ 
portionments  were  made. 

The  failure  to  reapportion  has  caused  a  great  inequality 
among  the  present  51  senatorial  districts.  Certain  sena¬ 
torial  districts  both  down-state  and  in  Cook  County  have 
been  decreasing  in  population  according  to  the  1920  census, 
until  now  they  have  much  less  than  the  constitutional  ratio 
of  representation.  Other  senatorial  districts  have  been  in¬ 
creasing  and  have  gone  beyond  the  ratio.  An  example  of  this 
inequality  within  Cook  County  is  that  of  the  Seventeenth  Dis¬ 
trict  with  58,000  as  compared  with  the  Twenty-fifth  District 
which  has  315,000.  The  present  apportionment  for  the  two 
houses  takes  no  account  of  changes  in  population  during  the 
past  twenty  years.  Although  the  Constitution  of  1870  pro¬ 
vides  for  equality  of  representation  on  the  basis  of  population, 
the  present  situation  is  one  of  distinct  inequality,  not  only  as 
between  Cook  County  and  the  remainder  of  the  State,  but 
also  as  among  the  51  senatorial  districts. 

This  situation  has  resulted  in  a  discrimination  as  to  both 
houses  against  all  of  the  more  rapidly  growing  portions  of 
the  State,  and  in  favor  of  the  less  rapidly  growing  counties. 
By  continuing  to  limit  Cook  County,  the  larger  down-state 
counties  also  limited  themselves. 


The  Constitutional  Convention,  in  committee  of  the  whole, 
has  proposed  a  plan  of  representation  which  permanently  dis¬ 
criminates  against  all  large  and  growing  counties  in  the  House 
of  Representatives,  and  permanently  discriminates  against 
Cook  County  in  both  House  and  Senate. 

On  December  20,  1920,  the  Constitutional  Convention  in 
committee  of  the  whole  adopted  a  plan,  which,  if  adhered  to 
and  approved  by  the  people,  will  restrict  the  representation 
of  Cook  County  in  both  houses  of  the  General  Assembly,  and 
the  representation  of  larger  counties  in  one  of  the  two  houses. 

Under  this  plan  the  Senate  is  to  be  composed  of  57  members, 
and  of  this  number  Cook  County  is  permanently  to  have  19 
members — one-third  of  the  total.  Cook  County  would  thus 
permanently  retain  the  same  number  of  Senators  that  it  now 
has  (upon  the  basis  of  its  population  in  1900)  but  will  have 
a  lesser  proportion  of  the  total.  Cook  County  now  has  19  out 
of  51  Senators,  a  proportion  of  37  per  cent,  whereas  under  the 
new  plan  she  would  permanently  have  19  out  of  57  Senators — 
or  33£  per  cent.  Under  this  plan  each  Senator  from  Cook 
County  will  represent  a  constituency  of  about  155,000  people, 
and  each  Senator  outside  of  Cook  County  a  constituency  of 
about  90,000  people. 

For  the  House  of  Representatives  the  plan  proposes  that 
each  county  shall  have  one  representative,  irrespective  of  the 
number  of  inhabitants,  and  that  each  county  having  a  popula¬ 
tion  of  more  than  50,000  shall  have  one  additional  representa¬ 
tive  for  each  additional  50,000  or  major  fraction  thereof. 
Under  this  plan  each  of  the  102  counties  will  have  one  repre¬ 
sentative.  The  plan  will  work  out  as  follows : 


8 


Each  county,  one  member .  102 

Cook  County,  additional  members .  60 

Kane  County,  additional  member .  1 

LaSalle  County,  additional  member. ...  1 

Madison  County,  additional  member. . .  1 

Peoria  County,  additional  member. ...  1 

Eock  Island  County,  additional  member  1 
Sangamon  County,  additional  member.  1 
Vermilion  County,  additional  member.  1 

Will  County,  additional  member .  1 

Winnebago  County,  additional  member  1 
St.  Clair  County,  additional  members . .  2 

Total..... .  173 

Thus,  this  proposal  gives  Cook  County  61  of  173  members, 
or  35  per  cent.  She  now  has  57  of  153,  or  37  per  cent. 

It  will  be  well  to  analyze  the  manner  in  which  the  proposal 
of  the  Constitutional  Convention  will  affect  Cook  County  and 
the  other  counties  of  the  State.  It  will  be  remembered  that 
Cook  County  now  has  about  47  per  cent  of  the  population  of 
the  entire  State.  Under  the  proposal  of  the  Constitutional 
Convention  Cook  County  will  be  permanently  limited  to  one- 
third  (33-£%)  in  the  Senate;  and  will  be  given  in  the  House  61 
of  173  members  (35%),  with  the  possibility  of  a  slight  in¬ 
crease,  if  Cook  County  grows  more  rapidly  than  the  rest  of 
the  State,  but  with  a  substantial  certainty  that  Cook  County, 
no  matter  what  its  population,  will  have  much  less  than  a 
majority  in  the  House. 

Thus,  the  proposed  plan  contemplates  a  permanent  restric¬ 
tion  in  both  houses  much  below  what  Cook  County’s  propor¬ 
tionate  population  would  entitle  it  to  under  a  rule  of  repre¬ 
sentation  according  to  population.  Cook  County  is,  of  course, 
not  now  entitled  to  a  majority  in  either  house  upon  the  basis 
of  population,  but  one  of  the  purposes  of  this  plan  is  to  make 
certain  that  Cook  County  shall  never  have  a  majority  in  either 


9 


)f  the  two  houses,  or  representation  in  either  of  the  houses 
ipproaching  close  to  a  majority.  Cook  County  now  has,  under 
;he  apportionment  of  1901,  37  per  cent  of  the  membership  of 
)oth  the  House  and  Senate,  and  under  the  present  constitu¬ 
tional  rule  would  have  47  per  cent  if  a  reapportionment  were 
nade,  whereas  the  proposed  plan  gives  only  35  per  cent  in 
the  House  under  the  apportionment  of  1920,  and  prescribes  a 
Dermanent  limitation  in  the  Senate  to  33^  per  cent. 

Although  this  plan  is  aimed  largely  at  Cook  County,  the 
ihief  avowed  purpose  of  the  plan  with  reference  to  the  House 
s  that  of  recognizing  each  county  and  giving  each  county 
me  representative.  The  plan  as  to  the  House  works  not  only 
;o  the  disadvantage  of  Cook  County  but  also  to  the  disad¬ 
vantage  of  all  the  more  populous  counties  of  the  State.  It  is 
i  distinct  discrimination  against  the  larger  counties  in  favor 
>f  the  smaller  counties.  There  are  102  counties  in  Illinois,  and 
;here  is  wide  variation  in  population  among  these  counties, 
rhe  ratio  for  additional  representation  is  50,000,  but  83  coun- 
;ies  have  less  than  50,000 ;  53  have  less  than  25,000,  and  9  have 
ess  than  10,000.  To  give  each  small  county  one  representa- 
ive  means  a  material  over-representation  of  the  small  coun- 
ies.  Fifty-six  of  the  102  counties  in  Illinois  decreased  in 
mpulation  during  the  past  ten  years.  Any  suggestion  that 
his  may  not  work  with  complete  fairness  to  the  larger  coun- 
ies  in  no  way  criticizes  the  smaller  counties,  many  of  which 
ire  declining  in  population.  Such  a  statement  merely  recog- 
lizes  that  the  inhabitants  of  such  counties  are  less  numerous. 

It  may  be  worth  while  to  analyze  briefly  the  actual  effect  of 
his  plan  by  a  comparison  of  representation  of  large  and  small 
counties  under  it.  Under  this  plan  Hardin  County,  with  7,533 
nhabitants,  has  one  representative,  and  so  also  has  Lake 
bounty  with  74,285.  The  three  small  counties  of  Calhoun, 
lardin  and  Putnam,  with  a  combined  population  of  less  than 
!4,000,  will  have  three  representatives,  whereas  St.  Clair,  with 
.36,520,  will  also  have  three  representatives.  The  counties 


10 


which  have  one  or  more  additional  representatives  are  not  s 
seriously  affected,  however,  as  the  counties  having  a  popuh 
tion  between  50,000  and  75,000.  The  table  given  below  ind 
cates  the  eight  counties  having  between  50,000  and  75,00 
inhabitants,  and  one  representative  each,  and  presents  in  pai 
allel  column  for  comparison,  eight  of  the  nine  counties  havin 
less  than  10,000  inhabitants,  and  also  having  one  represents 
tive  each: 

Under  75,000 — 1  each  Under  10,000 — 1  each 


Adams  . 

.  62,188 

Brown . 

.  9,33 

Champaign  . . . 

.  56,959 

Calhoun  . . . 

.  8,24 

Franklin  . 

.  57,293 

Edwards  . . . 

.  9,43 

Lake  . 

.  74,285 

Hardin  .... 

.  7,53 

McLean  . 

.  70,107 

Henderson  . 

.  9,77 

Macon . 

.  65,175 

Pope . 

.  9,62 

Macoupin . 

.  57,274 

Putnam  . . . 

.  7,57 

Williamson  . . . 

. 61,092 

Scott  . 

.  9,48 

It  is  readily 

seen  from  this 

table  that  in 

the  first  grou 

eight  members  represent  505,076  people,  while  in  the  secorn 
group  eight  members  represent  71,008  people.  A  voter  i 
Lake  County  has  for  representation  in  the  House  of  Reprc 
sentatives  about  one-tenth  of  the  effectiveness  of  a  voter  i: 
Hardin  County.  The  proposed  plan  discriminates  to  a  muc 
greater  extent  against  the  larger  down-state  counties  than  i 
does  against  Cook  County.  Under  its  terms  the  11  large 
counties  which  get  more  than  one  representative  have  a  com 
bined  representation  in  the  House  of  Representatives  of  8 
members,  about  47  per  cent  of  the  total  number,  althoug: 
they  have  nearly  two-thirds  of  the  population  of  the  Stat( 

It  will  thus  be  seen  that  the  proposal  of  the  Constitutions 
Convention  discriminates  permanently  against  Cook  Count; 
in  both  houses  of  the  General  Assembly,  and  at  the  same  tim 
discriminates  to  an  even  greater  extent  against  the  large! 
down-state  counties  in  the  House  but  not  in  the  Senate. 


11 


The  plan  of  limited  representation  is  opposed  to  the  funda¬ 
mental  principles  of  American  Government.  Unsatisfactory 
conditions  as  to  representation  in  a  few  other  States  consti¬ 
tute  no  argument  in  favor  of  the  adoption  of  a  bad  plan  by 
Illinois.  In  all  but  a  few  States  the  American  Plan  of  equal 
representation  exists  for  both  houses,  or  for  one  of  the  two 
houses. 

It  is  argued  that  the  county  is  an  important  political  com¬ 
munity  with  an  individuality  of  its  own,  and  should  be  recog¬ 
nized  in  the  representative  system  of  the  State  irrespective 
of  great  variations  in  county  population.  In  Illinois  there 
has  never  been  a  constitutional  recognition  of  a  right  in  the 
county  as  such  to  representation  irrespective  of  its  popula¬ 
tion,  although  all  of  the  constitutions  of  Illinois  have  required 
that  representative  districts  be  bounded  by  county  lines  ex¬ 
cept  where  a  county  is  entitled  to  more  than  one  district. 

It  is  urged  that  population  is  not  and  should  not  be  the  sole 
basis  of  representation,  and  that  the  various  States  of  this 
country  recognize  and  provide  for  geographical  representa¬ 
tion  in  many  cases  without  reference  to  population.  The  plan 
of  geographical  representation  has  a  historical  basis  in  New 
England,  hut  the  failure  to  make  adequate  readjustment  upon 
the  basis  of  increasing  population  has  led  to  a  distinct  over¬ 
representation  of  rural  communities  not  only  in  the  two  New 
England  States  of  Rhode  Island  and  Connecticut,  but  also  in 
Delaware  and  Maryland.  In  three  of  these  States,  there  is  in 
both  houses  of  the  legislature  rural  domination  of  the  great 
urban  communities.  These  States  are  not  satisfactory  illus¬ 
trations  in  favor  of  establishing  such  a  system  in  the  State  of 
Illinois;  for  their  politics  has  usually  been  unsatisfactory, 
and  the  rural  domination  of  urban  communities  has  resulted 
to  the  dissatisfaction  not  only  of  the  cities,  but  of  the  State 
as  a  whole. 

In  a  number  of  other  States  a  rule  of  territorial  representa- 


tion  works  in  such  a  manner  as  to  give  smaller  geographical 
areas  a  distinct  over-representation  in  one  of  the  two  houses 
of  the  legislature.  In  this  manner  the  larger  cities  are  dis¬ 
tinctly  under-represented  in  one  of  the  two  houses,  hut  not  in 
the  other.  Such  a  situation  exists  in  New  York,  Missouri, 
Alabama,  North  Carolina,  South  Carolina,  New  Jersey,  Idaho, 
Vermont,  Florida,  Georgia,  Montana  and  New  Hampshire; 
and  to  a  less  extent  in  Pennsylvania,  Iowa,  Ohio,  Kansas, 
Mississippi  and  Montana.  It  must  be  remembered,  however, 
that  these  cases  present  illustrations  of  the  under-representa¬ 
tion  of  urban  communities  in  only  one  of  the  two  houses,  and 
in  no  way  support  arguments  in  favor  of  a  permanent  under¬ 
representation  in  both  houses.  Those  desiring  a  limitation  of 
representation  in  both  houses  appear  to  regard  their  case  as 
supported  by  all  instances  of  inequality  in  one  house  resulting 
from  the  representation  of  geographical  areas. 

In  this  connection,  the  States  of  New  York  and  Pennsyl¬ 
vania  are  most  often  referred  to  by  those  urging  a  constitu¬ 
tional  limitation  upon  great  cities  in  both  houses  of  the  Illi¬ 
nois  General  Assembly.  In  Pennsylvania  there  is  a  limitation 
in  the  State  Senate  which  prevents  the  City  of  Philadelphia 
obtaining  more  than  8  senators.  This  city  would,  upon  the 
basis  of  present  population,  be  entitled  to  10  Senators.  How¬ 
ever,  there  is  no  discrimination  in  the  House  of  Representa¬ 
tives  of  Pennsylvania. 

In  New  York  there  is  a  constitutional  limitation  to  the  ef¬ 
fect  that  no  one  county  shall  ever  have  more  than  one-third  of 
the  members  of  the  State  Senate,  and  that  no  two  counties  (or 
the  territory  thereof  as  organized  in  1895)  which  are  adjoin¬ 
ing  or  are  separated  only  by  public  waters,  may  have  more 
than  one-half  of  all  the  Senators.  Bronx  County  was  organ¬ 
ized  in  1915  out  of  a  part  of  New  York  County,  and  is  there¬ 
fore  covered  by  this  rule.  New  York  City  is  composed  of  I 
five  counties,  and  this  constitutional  provision  forbids  the 
three  counties  of  New  York,  Bronx,  and  Kings,  ever  having 


13 


more  than  one-half  of  the  Senate.  New  York  excludes  aliens 
in  providing  representation  on  the  basis  of  population.  The 
one  discrimination  against  New  York  City  in  the  New  York 
State  Senate  is  that  which  results  from  excluding  aliens  and 
from  excluding  the  major  fractions  of  the  ratio  of  the  Senate 
representation.  The  New  York  rule  as  to  the  State  Senate 
permits  three  of  five  counties  in  New  York  City  to  have  one- 
half  of  the  Senators  when  entitled  to  that  number,  and  im¬ 
poses  no  limitation  upon  the  five  counties  together. 

The  serious  inequality  which  exists  in  one  of  the  New  Eng¬ 
land  States  (Rhode  Island)  with  respect  to  both  houses,  and 
in  three  of  the  other  New  England  States  (Vermont,  Connec¬ 
ticut  and  New  Hampshire)  with  respect  to  one  house,  has 
developed  largely  because  of  the  historical  recognition  of  small 
units  of  local  government.  Readjustments  made  from  time  to 
time  toward  a  system  of  greater  equality  have  not  remedied 
the  serious  and  unfortunate  conditions  existing  in  these  States. 
Not  only  is  there  no  historical  basis  justifying  the  deliberate 
establishment  of  a  similar  inequality  in  Illinois,  but  the  princi¬ 
ple  of  equal  representation  is  a  fundamental  one,  not  only  in 
Illinois  constitutional  history,  but  in  the  Ordinance  of  1787, 
under  which  Illinois  was  first  governed.  This  ordinance  ex¬ 
pressly  provided  as  a  part  of  the  articles  of  compact  between 
the  original  States  and  the  people  and  States  in  the  Northwest 
Territory,  that  there  should  be  ‘  ‘  a  proportionate  representation 
of  the  people  in  the  legislature.  ’  ’  Those  who  urge  representa¬ 
tion  upon  the  basis  of  geography  rather  than  upon  the  basis 
of  population  as  a  fundamental  principle  of  American  consti¬ 
tutional  government,  appear  to  know  more  about  such  funda¬ 
mental  principles  than  did  the  founders  of  this  republic. 


14 


The  proposal  of  the  Constitutional  Convention  involves  a 
permanent  limitation. 

In  connection  with  the  proposal  for  the  permanent  restric¬ 
tion  in  both  houses  of  the  General  Assembly,  it  should  also 
be  borne  in  mind  that  the  Constitutional  Convention  will  prob¬ 
ably  propose  that  a  new  constitutional  convention  when  as¬ 
sembled  shall  be  composed  of  delegates  elected  from  legisla¬ 
tive  districts.  The  plan  of  permanently  restricted  represen¬ 
tation  through  the  terms  of  the  constitution  also  almost  of 
necessity  involves  a  plan  of  permanently  restricting  a  ma¬ 
jority  of  the  population  with  respect  to  changing  that  con¬ 
stitution  through  a  convention.  In  this  connection  it  may  be 
worth  while  to  call  attention  to  the  fact  that  even  if  New  York 
had  limited  its  greatest  city  in  both  houses  of  its  legislature 
(which  it  did  not)  that  limitation  would  not  be  so  material 
as  the  limitation  proposed  in  Illinois,  because  in  New  York 
the  people  vote  automatically  once  each  twenty  years  upon 
the  question  of  assembling  a  constitutional  convention.  The 
plan  in  Illinois  is  to  have  a  vote  upon  the  holding  of  a  consti¬ 
tutional  convention  taken  as  the  result  of  legislative  action, 
with  the  members  of  the  convention  elected  from  senatorial 
districts.  Legislative  proposal  of  constitutional  amendments 
would,  of  course,  be  made  by  the  two  houses  constituted  upon 
the  restrictive  basis.  Under  the  Illinois  proposal,  therefore,  a 
limitation  of  representation  once  established  is  established  for 
all  time,  irrespective  of  the  growth  of  different  portions  of 
the  State  in  population. 


One  avowed  purpose  of  the  plan  is  to  limit  all  industrial 
communities. 

It  is  urged  that  urban  communities  are  radical  and  that 
they  should  therefore  be  limited  in  representation.  This  argu¬ 
ment  applies  to  all  of  the  urban  communities  of  the  State,  and 
the  proposed  plan  of  representation  in  the  House  of  Repre- 


15 


sentatives  forbids  representation  of  all  larger  counties  in  pro¬ 
portion  to  their  population.  It  is  not  in  accordance  with  the 
facts  of  American  political  history  that  radical  movements 
originate  chiefly  in  urban  communities.  It  may  be  well  to 
suggest  that  the  Granger  movement,  the  Greenback  move¬ 
ment,  the  Populist  movement,  the  Free  Silver  movement,  and 
the  Non-partisan  League,  originated  in  rural  communities. 
All  of  these  movements  were  termed  radical  by  at  least  a  large 
portion  of  the  community.  It  is  hardly  necessary  to  point  out 
that  this  argument  is  opposed  to  the  whole  principle  of  repub¬ 
lican  government,  under  which  the  people  are  vested  with 
power  to  govern  themselves. 


It  is  unwise  to  base  the  permanent  organization  of  govern¬ 
ment  upon  the  desire  to  advance  a  particular  reform,  no  mat¬ 
ter  how  important  in  itself  that  reform  may  be.  Not  only 
this,  but  the  anti-saloon  forces  will  strengthen  themselves  in 
Cook  County,  and  accomplish  the  result  at  which  they  aim, 
through  the  abolition  of  cumulative  voting,  already  agreed 
upon  by  the  Constitutional  Convention.  From  the  standpoint 
of  this  particular  movement,  the  proposed  double  limitation 
is  unwise. 

It  is  urged  that  the  members  of  the  lower  house  of  the  Illi¬ 
nois  General  Assembly  from  Cook  County  have  in  a  distinct 
majority  been  opposed  to  restrictions  upon  the  liquor  traffic, 
and  that  at  the  1921  session  of  the  Illinois  General  Assembly 
they  were  opposed  to  effective  means  for  the  enforcement  of 
the  Federal  prohibition  amendment.  This  argument  proceeds 
upon  the  theological  doctrine  of  “ total  depravity”  and  as¬ 
sumes  that  because  the  majority  of  the  people  of  one  portion  of 
the  State  have  not  agreed  with  one  particular  matter  of  gov¬ 
ernmental  policy,  their  influence  in  government  should  there¬ 
fore  be  reduced  or  withdrawn.  The  argument  here  goes  only 
part  way,  and  assumes  that  on  account  of  the  attitude  of  the 


16 


majority  of  Cook  County  members,  the  representation  of 
Cook  County  should  only  be  reduced;  but  pushed  to  its 
logical  extreme  it  would  lead  to  a  complete  denial  of  self-gov¬ 
ernment,  or  of  any  share  in  representation  to  Cook  County  in 
the  Illinois  General  Assembly.  The  same  argument  may  also 
be  applied  to  a  number  of  the  larger  down-state  counties,  rep¬ 
resentatives  from  which  have  also  at  various  times  been  op¬ 
posed  to  prohibition  measures. 

This  argument  bases  the  whole  principle  of  self-government 
upon  one  issue,  which  is  important,  but  which  is  not  con¬ 
trolling  from  the  standpoint  of  the  permanent  government  of 
the  State  of  Illinois.  In  earlier  times  we  had  despotisms, 
which  determined  according  to  their  own  discretion  what  was 
best  for  the  people  who  were  governed;  but  fortunately  that 
condition  of  affairs  is  gone  and  will  never  be  restored.  The 
assumption  that  any  one  group  of  people  can  now  determine 
what  is  best  for  the  people  of  a  great  State  for  all  time,  is 
based  upon  precisely  the  same  political  theory  as  were  the 
despotisms  of  the  earlier  days.  To  decide  that  a  community 
is  incompetent  for  representation  or  for  effective  representa¬ 
tion  because  a  majority  of  its  representatives  in  1921  and  in 
preceding  years  may  have  been  on  one  side  of  a  particular 
issue  of  governmental  policy,  is  unwise  and  dangerous. 


To  some  extent  the  remainder  of  the  State  fears  Cook 
County  domination.  Cook  County  members  of  the  House  and 
Senate  have  never  been  so  united  in  their  views  as  to  domi¬ 
nate  the  two  houses;  but  their  possible  domination,  should 
Cook  County  have  a  majority  of  population,  is  prevented  by 
limitation  of  representation  in  one  of  the  two  houses.  To  limit 
in  both  is  to  act  unfairly,  and  permit  domination  of  Cook 
County  by  the  remainder  of  the  State. 

It  is  urged  that  Cook  County  must  not  be  permitted  to  gov¬ 
ern  the  State.  But  the  prevention  of  the  control  of  the  State 


17 


Legislature  by  Cook  County  or  by  the  other  larger  counties 
of  the  State  is  accomplished  by  limitation  in  one  house  of  the 
General  Assembly;  and  such  a  limitation  affords  an  oppor¬ 
tunity  for  the  recognition  of  the  American  principle  of  equal 
representation  in  the  other.  To  limit  Cook  County  representa¬ 
tion  permanently  in  both  houses  and  also  to  limit  materially 
the  representation  of  other  large  urban  communities  in  one 
house,  is  substantially  to  say  that  these  larger  communities 
shall  not  be  permitted  to  dominate  the  rest  of  the  State,  but 
may  properly  be  dominated  by  the  smaller  communities. 

Those  who  favor  a  sharp  limitation  of  Cook  County  repre¬ 
sentation  in  both  houses  of  the  General  Assembly  argue  that 
a  limitation  merely  in  one  house  will  cause  frequent  deadlocks 
between  the  two  houses ;  and  that  if  there  is  to  be  a  limitation 
at  all,  limitation  in  both  houses  is  logically  and  practically 
necessary.  The  argument  that  deadlocks  will  be  occasioned 
unless  there  is  a  limitation  in  both  houses  is  not  borne  out  by 
fact.  Those  favoring  such  a  double  limitation  argue  on  the 
one  hand  that  this  double  limitation  is  necessary  in  order  to 
avoid  deadlocks;  and  argue  on  the  other  hand  that  Cook 
County  will  be  sufficiently  protected  by  its  share  in  the  election 
of  a  governor,  who  may  by  his  veto  occasion  a  complete  dead¬ 
lock  in  legislation.  If  there  is  any  validity  in  the  argument 
that  Cook  County  will  elect  the  governor,  such  an  election  of 
the  governor  may  produce  a  much  more  effective  deadlock  in 
legislation  than  any  which  is  established  by  the  application 
of  a  different  rule  of  representation  to  the  two  houses. 

Not  only  this,  but  in  the  effort  to  limit  Cook  County  repre¬ 
sentation  an  appeal  is  made  to  the  example  of  the  national 
government.  In  the  national  government  each  State  is  recog¬ 
nized  as  an  equal  unit  in  the  Senate.  In  the  House  of  Repre¬ 
sentatives  the  States  are  represented  upon  the  basis  of  popu¬ 
lation,  however,  although  there  are  two  members  out  of  more 
than  400  who  represent  constituencies  not  up  to  the  established 
ratio  of  representation,  under  the  provision  that  every  State 
regardless  of  population  shall  have  at  least  one  representative. 


18 


There  has  substantially  never  been  a  clear  alignment  of 
Cook  County  representation  against  the  representation  of 
other  communities  of  the  State,  and  deadlocks  are  not  likely 
to  result  between  the  two  houses  because  of  possible  align¬ 
ment  of  this  character  in  the  future.  Legislation  which 
has  been  adopted,  even  prohibition  legislation,  has  been 
carried  by  the  aid  of  Cook  County  votes;  and  legislation 
which  has  been  defeated  has  been  defeated  by  the  combina¬ 
tion  of  Cook  County  and  down-state  votes.  No  sectional  issue 
now  presents  itself  in  the  State  of  Illinois  either  in  the  two 
houses  of  the  Illinois  General  Assembly  or  in  the  election  of 
a  governor.  Unfair  treatment  of  Cook  County  and  of  the  other 
large  urban  communities  of  the  State  through  constitutional 
provision  will  necessarily  establish  and  maintain  the  sec¬ 
tional  issue  which  has  been  raised  in  the  Constitutional  Con¬ 
vention. 

One  argument  for  limitation  of  Cook  County  representation 
in  the  two  houses  is  that  the  members  from  Cook  County  con¬ 
stitute  an  undivided  unit  and  will  vote  as  such,  while  there 
will  be  no  such  unity  among  the  members  from  other  parts  of 
the  State.  Upon  this  basis  it  is  contended  that  one-third  of 
the  members  of  the  legislative  body  acting  as  a  unit  will  have 
more  than  one-third  of  the  influence  in  that  body.  It  is  well 
recognized  that  a  stockholder  in  a  corporation  who  owns  one- 
third  of  the  stock  may  ordinarily  control  the  affairs  of  the 
corporation  by  voting  his  stock  as  a  unit,  if  the  other  two- 
thirds  of  the  stock  is  scattered  among  various  owners.  How¬ 
ever,  no  such  situation  presents  itself  or  ever  has  presented 
itself  in  the  Illinois  General  Assembly.  There  has  never  been 
a  united  control  over  Cook  County  members  of  such  a  char¬ 
acter  as  to  cast  the  votes  of  Cook  County  in  the  two  houses  of 
the  General  Assembly  as  a  unit.  Cook  County  has  had  its 
periods  of  boss  domination,  just  as  have  many  counties  and 
larger  areas  of  territory  in  other  parts  of  the  State,  but  this 
domination  has  never  extended  to  an  undivided  control  over 


19 


Cook  County  representation  in  the  two  houses.  Such  a  united 
action  upon  the  part  of  Cook  County  representatives  in  the 
General  Assembly,  and  such  a  political  dominance  over  these 
representatives  is  out  of  the  question  under  present  condi¬ 
tions,  and  could  only  be  forced  as  a  means  of  necessary  self- 
defense  by  an  unfair  discrimination  which  would  compel  unity 
among  the  Cook  County  members  of  the  General  Assembly 
and  the  permanent  establishment  of  sectional  lines  to  the  dis¬ 
advantage  of  the  State  and  of  Cook  County  itself. 

The  State  of  Illinois  must  preserve  its  unity  as  a  State;  and 
in  preserving  that  unity  as  a  State,  its  political  future  ought 
not  to  be  overshadowed  by  an  act  of  great  political  injustice, 
which  will  permanently  establish  lines  of  sectional  division 
between  the  larger  and  the  smaller  communities.  The  pro¬ 
posal  of  the  Constitutional  Convention  is  of  importance  not 
merely  for  the  present,  but  for  the  whole  future  of  this  State. 


APPENDIX. 


Representation  in  the  48  States. 

(Except  where  otherwise  indicated,  statements  as  to  population  refer  to  the 
United  States  Census  of  1920) 


ALABAMA.  CONSTITUTION  OF  1901. 

The  House  now  consists  of  106  members,  of  whom  each  of  the  67  counties 
must  have  at  least  1.  No  county  has  less  than  60  per  cent  of  the  population 
ratio,  and  only  2  have  less  than  75  per  cent.  There  is  no  substantial  dis¬ 
crimination  necessary  under  the  rule. 

The  Senate  consists  of  (not  more  than)  35  members,  elected  from  as 
many  districts,  as  nearly  equal  in  population  as  may  be,  no  county  being 
divided  between  2  districts.  Under  this  rule  no  county  can  have  more  than 
1  senator;  upon  a  population  basis  one  county  would  be  entitled  to  4  sena¬ 
tors;  it  can  have  but  one. 

ARIZONA.  CONSTITUTION  OF  1912. 

The  first  apportionment  is  set  up  in  the  Constitution,  to  stand  “until  other¬ 
wise  provided  by  law.”  There  is  no  rule  for  subsequent  apportionments. 


ARKANSAS.  CONSTITUTION  OF  1874. 

The  House  consists  of  not  more  than  100  members,  of  whom  each  of  the 
counties  is  entitled  to  at  least  one.  No  county  has  less  than  one-half  the 
ratio,  and  only  13  have  less  than  three-quarters.  The  rule  involves  no 
material  discrimination  in  the  House.  The  Senate  consists  of  35  members 
from  as  many  districts,  equal  in  population  as  nearly  as  practicable. 

CALIFORNIA.  CONSTITUTION  OF  1879. 

The  House  consists  of  80  members  and  the  Senate  of  40,  elected  in  each 
case  from  single  member  districts,  as  nearly  equal  in  population  as  may  be, 
regard  being  had  to  county  lines. 

COLORADO.  CONSTITUTION  OF  1876. 

The  legislature  has  full  power  to  district  the  State,  save  that  it  may  not 
divide  counties  and  that  it  must  use  the  population  basis.  Counties  may 
be  given  any  number  of  representatives  and  two  or  more  counties  may  be 
united  to  form  a  single  district. 


22 


CONNECTICUT.  CONSTITUTION  OF  1818  AND  SUBSEQUENT 
AMENDMENTS. 

The  House  of  Representatives,  under  an  ancient  rule  which  was  merely 
continued  by  reference  in  the  Constitution  of  1818,  and  was  slightly  modi¬ 
fied  in  1874  and  1876,  consists  of  262  members  of  whom  74  are  elected  by  74 
towns  each  electing  1,  and  188  by  94  towns  each  electing  2.  Those  electing 
1  range  in  population  from  266  up  to  4,342,  and  those  electing  2,  from  257 
up  to  162,537.  One  elector  in  Union  town  of  Tolland  County  has  the  same 
political  weight  as  630  in  New  Haven.  New  Haven,  Hartford,  Bridgeport, 
Waterbury,  New  Britain,  Stanford,  Meriden,  Norwich,  Norwalk,  New  Lon¬ 
don,  Danbury,  Middletown,  Fairfield,  Greenwich,  Torrington,  and  Bristol, 
with  60  per  cent  of  the  population,  have  32  members,  or  12  1/5  per  cent  of  the 
House.  Forty-one  other  towns  having  each  less  than  1,000  population,  and 
having  all  told  not  25,000  people,  1.8  per  cent  of  the  population  of  the  State, 
have  54  members,  or  20^  per  cent  of  the  legislature.  The  121  towns  having 
each  less  than  5,000  people,  and  in  all  206,775  out  of  the  State’s  population 
of  1,380,631,  elect  169  representatives  out  of  262 — 15  per  cent  of  the  people 
elect  64  per  cent  of  the  Representatives. 

The  Senate,  under  a  rule  adopted  in  1901,  may  consist  of  not  more  than 
36  members,  and  each  county  must  have  at  least  1.  Under  the  census  of 
1910  there  have  been  35  Senators.  Under  the  census  of  1920,  and  with  36 
Senators,  one  county  would  have  .7  of  a  ratio  and  one  Senator;  two  coun¬ 
ties  would  have  1.25  and  1.37  of  a  ratio  respectively  and  one  Senator  each; 
one  county  with  8.4  ratios  might  get  8  Senators,  and  four  counties  with  2,  3, 
9,  and  11  Senators  respectively  would  each  lose  a  minor  fraction  above  a  full 
final  ratio.  Thus,  there  is  no  substantial  discrimination  necessary  in  the 
Connecticut  Senate  under  the  Constitutional  rule. 

DELAWARE.  CONSTITUTION  OF  1897. 

The  House  of  Representatives  consists  of  35  members,  elected  from  as 
many  districts,  each  of  which  was  definitely  bounded  in  the  Constitution  of 
1897,  and  may  not  be  changed  except  as  the  districts  in  the  City  of  Wil¬ 
mington  may  be  enlarged  by  the  annexation  of  territory  to  the  city  and 
adjoining  districts  consequently  diminished.  Ten  districts  are  defined  in 
each  of  Kent  and  Sussex  Counties,  10  in  Newcastle  County  outside  of  the 
City  of  Wilmington,  and  5  within  the  City  of  Wilmington.  Upon  the  1890 
census  an  apportionment  by  population  would  have  entitled  Kent  County  to 
7  members,  Sussex  to  8,  Newcastle  outside  Wilmington  to  7,  and  Wilmington 
to  13.  In  1920  such  an  apportionment  would  entitle  Kent  County  to  5  mem¬ 
bers,  Sussex  to  7,  Newcastle  outside  of  Wilmington  to  6,  and  Wilmington 
to  17.  The  State  ratio  in  1920  would  be  6,371;  but  the  average  constituency 
in  Kent  County  is  3,102;  in  Sussex  4,374;  in  Newcastle,  outside  Wilmington, 
3,807;  and  in  Wilmington  22,033. 

The  Senate  in  Delaware  consists  of  17  members,  from  as  many  districts, 
definitely  bounded,  and  unchangeable  except  as  Wilmington  City  may  annex 
adjoining  territory.  Kent  and  Sussex  counties  have  each  5,  Newcastle 
County  outside  of  Wilmington  has  5,  and  Wilmington  2.  An  equal  appor- 


23 


tionment  upon  the  1890  census  would  have  given  Kent  County  3,  Sussex  4, 
Newcastle  County  outside  of  Wilmington  4,  and  Wilmington  6.  Upon  the 
1920  census  Kent  would  have  2,  Sussex  3,  Newcastle  outside  of  Wilmington 
3,  and  Wilmington  8.  The  State  ratio  would  be  13,118;  the  average  con¬ 
stituency  in  Kent  is  6,205;  in  Sussex  8,748;  in  Newcastle  outside  of  Wil¬ 
mington  7,614;  and  in  Wilmington  55,084. 

FLORIDA.  CONSTITUTION  OF  1885. 

In  the  House  each  of  the  counties  must  have  at  least  1  member,  and  no 
one  county  may  have  more  than  3.  Eight  counties  have  less  than  half  the 
ratio  of  population.  Two  large  counties  which,  together,  would  have  14 
members  upon  a  population  basis  are  reduced  to  6  under  the  rule.  As  to 
the  Senate,  the  provision  is  that  the  legislature  shall  re-apportion  every  ten 
years,  without  specifying  the  basis  of  apportionment. 

GEORGIA.  CONSTITUTION  OF  1877— AMENDED  1920  AS  TO  HOUSE. 

The  House  now  consists  of  193  members,  of  whom  the  8  largest  coun¬ 
ties  have  each  3,  the  30  next  in  size  have  each  2,  and  the  remaining  counties 
have  1  each.  The  4  largest  counties  would,  upon  a  population  basis,  be 
entitled  to  32  members,  and  they  get  but  12.  Fulton  County  (containing 
Atlanta)  gets  but  3  of  the  16  to  which  her  population  would  entitle  her. 
Senators  are  apportioned  according  to  population. 

IDAHO.  CONSTITUTION  OF  1890— AS  AMENDED  1912. 

The  House  may  consist  of  not  more  than  three  times  as  many  members 
as  the  Senate  has,  or  132  members.  Each  of  the  44  counties  must  have  one 
member.  The  two  smallest  counties  have  each  50  per  cent  of  the  ratio 
upon  a  population  basis;  five  others  have  from  60  to  90  per  cent  of  a  ratio 
only.  Of  the  other  counties  which  have  one  or  more  full  ratios  and  a  sur¬ 
plus  of  more  than  half,  only  three  need  be  deprived  of  the  additional  mem¬ 
ber  to  which  that  surplus  would  otherwise  entitle  them.  Only  two  members 
of  132  need  come  from  constituencies  which  are  over-represented  as  much 
as  100  per  cent. 

The  Senate  consists  of  one  member  for  each  of  the  44  counties.  Of 
these,  thirty  represent  counties  having  less  than  a  proportionate  ratio  of 
population.  Four  counties  have  but  20  per  cent  of  the  ratio,  and  eight  others 
have  less  than  half.  Ten  counties  have  between  one  and  two  full  ratios; 
three  counties  have  almost  three  full  ratios,  and  one  has  three  and  one- 
half  ratios.  One-fourth  of  the  people  in  the  23  smallest  counties  elect  a 
majority  of  the  Senate;  another  fourth,  in  the  four  largest  counties,  elect 
but  1/11  of  the  Senate.  It  should  be  noted  that  between  1910  and  1920, 
a  great  many  new  counties  were  created,  dividing  and  reducing  other  coun¬ 
ties. 


ILLINOIS.  CONSTITUTION  OF  1870. 

Both  the  House  and  Senate  are  to  be  apportioned  each  ten  years  upon  a 
population  basis. 


24 


INDIANA.  CONSTITUTION  OF  1851. 

The  House  consists  of  100  members,  apportioned  upon  the  basis  of  the 
number  of  male  inhabitants  as  determined  by  State  censuses  each  six  years. 
The  Senate  consists  of  50  members,  chosen  upon  the  same  basis. 

IOWA.  CONSTITUTION  OF  1857— AMENDED  1904  AS  TO  HOUSE. 

The  House  consists  of  108  members,  of  whom  each  of  the  99  counties 
has  1,  and  each  of  the  9  largest  counties  has  1  additional.  Upon  a  popula¬ 
tion  basis,  1  county  would  be  entitled  to  7  members,  1  to  4,  and  5  to  3.  Each 
of  these  has  2.  The  Senate  is  apportioned  according  to  population. 

KANSAS.  CONSTITUTION  OF  1859— AS  AMENDED  1873. 

The  House  consists  of  125  members,  of  whom  each  of  the  105  counties 
is  entitled  to  1.  Upon  a  population  basis  one  county  would  have  9  mem¬ 
bers,  another  6,  two  each  5,  one  4,  three  each  3,  nine  each  2.  Prom  this 
group  19  must  be  taken  to  keep  within  the  maximum  of  125.  The  Senate 
is  based  on  population. 

KENTUCKY.  CONSTITUTION  OF  1891. 

The  House  consists  of  100  members.  There  are  120  counties.  “Not 
more  than  two  counties  shall  be  joined  together  to  form  a  Representative 
district;  provided,  in  doing  so  the  principles  requiring  every  district  to  be  as 
nearly  equal  in  population  as  may  be  shall  not  be  violated.”  The  Senate 
consists  of  38  members,  chosen  from  substantially  equal  districts. 

LOUISIANA.  CONSTITUTION  OF  1921. 

The  House  consisted  of  not  more  than  101  members,  of  whom  each  of 
the  63  parishes,  and  each  of  the  17  wards  of  New  Orleans  must  have  at 
least  1.  Four  parishes  have  less  than  half  the  ratio.  No  substantial  discrim¬ 
ination  is  involved.  The  Senate  is  apportioned  according  to  population. 

MAINE.  CONSTITUTION  OF  1819— AS  AMENDED  1841  AS  TO  HOUSE. 

The  House  consists  of  151  members,  apportioned  among  the  several 
counties  according  to  population,  exclusive  of  aliens  and  of  Indians  not 
taxed.  The  Senate  has  31  members,  apportioned  according  to  population. 

MARYLAND.  CONSTITUTION  OF  1867— AS  AMENDED  1901. 

House:  Each  of  the  23  counties  is  given  from  two  to  six  Representatives, 
according  to  a  population  schedule  fixed  by  the  Constitution.  Baltimore 
City,  which  is  not  in  any  county,  is  divided  into  4  districts,  each  of  which 
elects  as  many  Representatives  as  the  largest  county — 24  in  all.  Under  the 
1920  census  there  are  107  members,  of  which  number  6  counties  have  each 
2;  6  counties  have  each  3;  5  have  each  4;  3  have  each  5;  and  3  have  each  6. 
Under  an  apportionment  according  to  population,  Baltimore  would  have  54 
members;  8  counties  would  lose  2  each,  and  14  would  lose  1  each  of  what 


25 


they  now  have.  A  vote  in  Calvert  County  now  has  six  times  the  weight  of 
one  in  Baltimore  City. 

Senate:  Each  county,  and  each  of  the  4  districts  in  Baltimore,  elects  one 
Senator.  Upon  a  population  basis  Baltimore  City  should  elect  14  of  the  27, 
instead  of  4;  4  of  the  counties  have  more  than  the  full  ratio;  7  have  between 
50  per  cent  and  the  full  ratio.  A  Calvert  County  vote  has  the  weight  of  19 
in  Baltimore  City. 

MASSACHUSETTS.  CONSTITUTION  OF  1780— AS  AMENDED  1856. 

The  House  consists  of  240  members.  The  apportionment  is  made  among 
the  several  counties  according  to  the  relative  number  of  legal  voters  as 
ascertained  by  a  State  census  made  each  year  ending  in  5. 

The  Senate  consists  of  40  members,  to  be  elected  from  as  many  dis¬ 
tricts,  “each  district  to  contain,  as  nearly  as  may  be,  an  equal  number  of 
legal  voters,  *  *  *  and  such  districts  shall  be  formed,  as  nearly  as  may 

be,  without  uniting  two  counties,  or  parts  of  two  counties,  into  one  district.” 
One  county  has  but  3  per  cent,  one  but  4  per  cent,  one  but  about  25  per  cent, 
one  50  per  cent,  and  one  70  per  cent  of  the  1920  population  ratio.  All  others 
have  one  full  ratio  or  more.  It  is  not  necessary  to  give  the  very  small 
counties  a  Senator  each,  but  if  that  were  done,  no  county  would  need  to 
give  up  a  Senator  for  whom  it  would  have  more  than  7/10  of  a  ratio. 

There  need  be  no  substantial  discrimination  in  either  branch  of  the 
General  Court. 

MICHIGAN.  CONSTITUTION  OF  1908. 

Both  the  House  and  Senate  are  apportioned  according  to  population,  with 
a  reapportionment  required  each  ten  years. 

MINNESOTA.  CONSTITUTION  OF  1857. 

Both  the  House  and  Senate  are  apportioned  according  to  population. 

MISSISSIPPI.  CONSTITUTION  OF  1890. 

The  House  consists  of  133,  of  whom  each  of  the  82  counties  must  have 
at  least  1,  and  of  whom  a  group  of  23  designated  counties  must  have  at  least 
44,  another  group  of  29  designated  counties  must  have  at  least  44,  and  the 
remaining  30  counties  must  have  at  least  44.  No  county  has  less  than  61 
per  cent  of  the  ratio,  and  only  2  have  less  than  75  per  cent.  No  serious  dis¬ 
crimination  is  involved.  The  state  was  re-apportioned  into  senatorial  districts 
by  constitutional  amendment  in  1914.  Re-apportionments  are  to  be  made  by 
the  legislature. 

MISSOURI.  CONSTITUTION  OF  1875. 

The  number  of  members  of  the  House  is  not  fixed.  The  ratio  is  obtained 
by  dividing  the  population  of  the  State  by  200.  Each  county  has  at  least  one 
representative  and  no  more  than  one  until  it  has  2 y2  ratios;  each  having  2% 
or  more,  but  not  4  ratios,  2;  each  having  4  or  more,  but  not  six,  3;  each 
having  5  ratios,  4  representatives;  and  one  additional  representative  for 
each  additional  2  y2  ratios.  Seventeen  of  the  114  counties  have  less  than 


26 


half  ratio  if  members  were  apportioned  acording  to  population  under  the 
1920  census.  St.  Louis  City  would  have  33  members  under  such  an  oppor- 
tionment,  whereas  it  can  have  but  19;  Jackson  County,  including  Kansas 
City,  can  have  but  10  of  the  16  it  would  have;  4  other  counties  lose  1 
each.  The  two  largest  have  %  of  the  population,  and  only  1/5  of  the  repre¬ 
sentatives.  The  Senate  is  apportioned  according  to  population. 

MONTANA.  CONSTITUTION  OF  1889. 

The  House  consists  of  108  members,  apportioned  to  counties  or  to  dis¬ 
tricts  composed  of  counties,  according  to  population.  The  Senate  consists 
of  one  member  for  each  county.  At  present  eight  counties  would  be  enti¬ 
tled  to  sixteen  additional  members  upon  a  straight  population  basis. 

NEBRASKA.  CONSTITUTION  OF  1875,  AMENDED  1920. 

Both  the  House  and  Senate  are  apportioned  according  to  population 
“excluding  aliens.” 


NEVADA.  CONSTITUTION  OF  1864. 

Both  the  House  and  Senate  are  apportioned  according  to  population. 

NEW  MEXICO.  CONSTITUTION  OF  1912. 

Both  the  House  and  Senate  are  apportioned  according  to  population. 
Districts  may  elect  any  number  or  may  (as  in  first  apportionment)  overlap. 

NEW  HAMPSHIRE.  CONSTITUTION  OF  1784— AS  AMENDED 
1878  AND  1889. 

The  House  consists  of  1  member  for  each  town,  place,  or  city  ward  having 
600  inhabitants;  2  for  those  having  1,800;  and  so  on,  using  1,200  as  a  mean 
increasing  number.  Those  having  fewer  than  600  inhabitants  send  repre¬ 
sentatives  a  proportionate  part  of  the  time.  Under  this  rule  about  100  of 
the  200  such  places  (approximately)  are  entitled  to  send  one  or  more  repre¬ 
sentatives  to  every  session.  The  New  Hampshire  plan  gives  a  large  and 
cumbersome  House,  with  more  than  400  members  (the  largest  in  this  coun¬ 
try),  and  maintains  a  dominance  of  the  rural  towns.  The  Senate  consists 
of  24  members,  apportioned  to  as  many  districts,  according  to  direct  taxes 
Paid-  ii  —t:  s 

NEW  JERSEY.  CONSTITUTION  OF  1844. 

The  House  may  not  exceed  60  in  number,  and  each  of  the  21  counties 
must  have  1  member.  Three  counties  have  only  40  per  cent,  45  per  cent 
and  47  per  cent,  respectively,  of  the  proportionate  ratio  of  population;  1 
has  60  per  cent,  1  has  80  per  cent,  2  have  each  90  per  cent,  and  1  has  95 
per  cent.  Only  4  counties  have  one  or  more  full  ratios  and  a  surplus  of 
more  than  half,  3  have  1.6  ratios  each,  1  has  3.6  ratios.  None  of  these  could 
be  given  a  member  for  the  surplus.  But  no  county  need  lose  a  member  for 
which  it  has  a  full  ratio. 

The  Senate  consists  of  1  member  from  each  of  the  21  counties.  Nine 
counties  have  less  than  half  of  the  proportionate  ratio  of  population,  2  have 


27 


each  4  times,  and  1  has  almost  twice  the  ratio.  One-sixth  of  the  people, 
in  the  11  smallest  counties,  elect  a  majority  of  the  Senate;  two-fifths  of  the 
people  in  the  two  largest  counties  do  not  elect  one-tenth;  a  majority  of  the 
people  in  the  4  largest  counties  elect  but  one-fifth  of  the  Senate. 

NEW  YORK.  CONSTITUTION  OF  1894. 

The  House  consists  of  150  members,  of  whom  each  of  the  62  counties  has 
one,  except  that  Hamilton  County  is  attached  to  Fulton.  The  apportion¬ 
ment  is  to  be  made  as  nearly  as  may  be  according  to  citizen  population 
(excluding  aliens),  of  the  several  counties  as  determined  by  State  censuses 
taken  in  the  years  whose  numbers  end  in  5.  Under  the  apportionment  fol¬ 
lowing  the  census  of  1915  the  five  counties  constituting  the  City  of  New 
York  have  62  members,  whereas  their  citizen  population  would  have  given 
them  71  under  a  simple  apportionment.  Every  other  large  county  had  as 
many  members  as  it  is  entitled  to  upon  its  citizen  population.  The  giving 
of  representation  to  each  county  thus  leads  to  some  discrimination  against 
New  York  City. 

The  Senate  ratio  is  1/50  of  the  citizen  population.  “If  any  county  having 
three  or  more  Senators  at  the  time  of  any  apportionment  shall  be  entitled 
on  such  ratio  to  an  additional  Senator  or  Senators,  such  additional  Senator 
or  Senators  shall  be  given  to  such  county  in  addition  to  the  fifty  Senators, 
and  the  whole  number  of  Senators  shall  be  increased  to  that  extent.”  No 
one  county  may  have  more  than  1/3  of  the  Senators,  and  no  2  counties  or 
the  territory  thereof  as  organized  in  1894,  which  are  contiguous  or  separated 
only  by  public  waters,  shall  together  have  more  than  half  the  Senators. 

The  rule  thus  permits  three  counties  in  the  City  of  New  York  to  elect  half 
of  the  Senate  when  their  citizen  population  entitles  them  to  do  so,  and  the 
City  of  New  York  in  that  case  could  have  as  many  more  than  half  as  the 
growing  counties  of  Queens  and  Richmond  have  ratios  of  citizens. 

The  apportionment  of  1917,  on  the  1915  census,  gave  22  Senators  to  the 
four  largest  of  the  counties  in  New  York  City,  and  united  the  fifth  with  a 
very  small  county  which  is  outside  of  the  city.  The  city  as  a  whole  would 
have  been  entitled  to  23  Senators  upon  the  basis  of  citizen  population. 
Neither  the  one-third  nor  the  one-half  limitation  has  yet  operated  to  limit 
New  York  City. 

NORTH  CAROLINA.  CONSTITUTION  OF  1876. 

The  House  consists  of  120  members,  of  whom  each  of  the  100  counties 
must  have  at  least  1.  Thirteen  counties  have  each  less  than  half  of  the 
ratio.  Twenty-eight  counties,  which  would,  upon  the  basis  of  population, 
have  each  1,  2  or  3  additional  members,  in  total  37,  must  lose  17  of  such 
additional  members.  Giving  each  county  at  least  one  representative,  there¬ 
fore,  discriminates  against  the  more  populous  counties.  The  Senate  is 
apportioned  to  districts  according  to  population,  excluding  aliens  and  Indians 
not  taxed. 

NORTH  DAKOTA.  CONSTITUTION  OF  1889. 

Both  the  House  and  Senate  are  apportioned  according  to  population. 


28 


OHIO.  CONSTITUTION  OF  1851— AS  AMENDED  1903. 

The  House  ratio  is  1/100  of  the  population  of  the  state.  Each  county  has 
at  least  1.  Each  county  having  1  and  %  ratios  has  two;  thereafter  addi¬ 
tional  members  are  given  only  for  full  ratios,  except  that  members  are 
allowed  for  1,  2,  3,  or  4  sessions  of  the  decennium,  proportionate  to  the  size 
of  the  surplus.  Upon  a  straight  population  basis,  one  county  which  gets  16 
would  get  20,  two  which  get  4  each  would  get  6,  one  would  get  5  instead 
of  4,  and  three  would  get  4  each  instead  of  3  as  under  the  rule.  In  a  House 
of  about  125  members,  the  discrimination  against  any  one  county  is  relatively 
small. 

The  Senate  is  apportioned  to  districts  according  to  population. 

OKLAHOMA.  CONSTITUTION  OF  1907. 

The  House  ratio  is  1/100  of  the  population  of  the  state.  Every  county 
having  half  the  ratio  is  given  a  representative,  every  county  with  1% 
ratios  2,  and  thereafter  full  time  members  are  given  for  full  ratios  only, 
surpluses  of  fifths  entitling  the  county  to  send  members  to  certain  sessions 
each  decennium.  No  county  may  participate  in  the  election  of  more  than 
seven  representatives.  Under  the  census  of  1920  two  counties  fall  short 
of  half  the  ratio,  and  are  to  be  attached  to  other  counties.  No  county  is 
now  entitled  on  the  basis  of  its  population  to  elect  more  than  five  and  a 
fraction  members. 

The  Senate  is  apportioned  according  to  population. 

OREGON.  CONSTITUTION  OF  1857. 

The  House  may  not  exceed  60  members  and  any  county  having  half  the 
ratio  shall  have  one  representative.  Under  the  1920  census,  13  of  the  26 
counties  have  less  than  half  the  ratio. 

The  Senate  may  not  exceed  30  members  and  any  county  having  half  the 
ratio  is  given  one  senator.  Eighteen  counties  fall  short  of  one-half  the 
ratio.  The  rule  involves  slight  discrimination  against  Multnomah  county. 

PENNSYLVANIA.  CONSTITUTION  OF  1873. 

The  number  of  members  in  the  House  is  not  fixed.  The  ratio  is  ob¬ 
tained  by  dividing  the  population  of  the  state  by  200.  Each  county  is  given 
at  least  1  member.  Counties  with  surpluses  of  more  than  half  of  a  ratio 
are  given  an  additional  member  for  such  surpluses  above  1,  2,  3,  and  4  full 
ratios  only;  thereafter  any  surpluses  are  lost.  Under  this  rule,  12  of  the 
67  counties  have  less  than  half  the  ratio,  and  14  have  more  than  half  but 
less  than  the  full  ratio.  Philadelphia  has  41.8  ratios,  and  may  have  41  mem¬ 
bers,  out  of  207. 

The  Senate  consists  of  50  members,  of  whom  no  one  county  may  have 
more  than  1/6.  Philadelphia  has  10.4  ratios,  and  so  must  lose  2  to  which 
her  population  would  entitle  her. 


29 


RHODE  ISLAND.  CONSTITUTION  OF  1842-AMENDMENT  1909 
AS  TO  HOUSE. 

The  House  may  not  have  more  than  100  members  and  each  town  or  city 
must  have  one  member.  No  town  or  city  may  have  more  than  %  of  the 
House.  Under  an  apportionment  proportionate  to  population,  13  of  39  towns 
and  cities  would  have  less  than  half  the  ratio;  9  would  have  from  y2  to  1 
full  ratio.  If  each  of  these  were  given  at  least  1,  and  the  rest  as  many  as 
their  populations  entitle  them  to  under  the  ratio,  the  House  would  consist 
of  106  members,  of  which  Providence  would  have  39.  As  it  is,  Providence 
can  have  no  more  than  25  in  a  total  of  100. 

The  Senate  consists  of  39  members,  1  from  each  town  or  city.  Eighteen 
of  these  have  less  than  %  of  the  ratio  upon  a  population  basis;  4  have 
between  %  and  y2;  7  have  y2  or  more  and  less  than  the  full  ratio.  Provi¬ 
dence,  with  15.33  ratios;  Pawtucket,  with  4.15  ratios;  Woonsocket  with  2.6 
ratios;  Newport  and  Cranston  each  with  1.95  ratios,  and  Central  Falls  with 
1.6  ratios,  have  each  1  senator  only.  West  Greenwich  has  but  2%  of  a 
ratio,  but  has  a  senator;  a  vote  there  has  647  times  the  weight  of  one  in 
Providence. 

SOUTH  CAROLINA.  CONSTITUTION  OF  1895. 

The  House  consists  of  124  members,  of  whom  each  of  the  46  counties 
must  have  at  least  1.  Only  one  county  has  less  than  a  full  ratio,  and  it 
has  72%. 

The  Senate  consists  of  46  members,  1  from  each  county.  Upon  a  popula¬ 
tion  basis,  1  county  has  3  ratios,  1  has  2.55  ratios,  4  have  from  1  y2  to  2 y2 
ratios,  37  have  from  y2  to  1  y2  ratios,  and  only  3  have  less  than  half  of  a 
ratio.  The  discrimination  diminishes  the  14  members  to  which  population 
would  entitle  the  six  largest  counties  to  6. 

SOUTH  DAKOTA.  CONSTITUTION  OF  1889. 

Both  the  House  and  Senate  are  apportioned  according  to  population,  ex¬ 
cluding  Indians  not  taxed  and  soldiers  and  officers  of  the  United  States  Army 
and  Navy. 

TENNESSEE.  CONSTITUTION  OF  1870. 

The  House  consists  of  99  members,  apportioned  to  counties  or  districts 
composed  of  counties  according  to  the  number  of  qualified  voters  as  deter¬ 
mined  by  a  special  decennial  enumeration.  Any  county  having  two-thirds 
of  the  ratio  is  given  a  member.  Under  the  1920  population  38  of  the  96 
counties  fall  short  of  the  required  number.  The  rule  involves  no  discrimina¬ 
tions.  Senators  are  apportioned  upon  the  basis  of  the  number  of  quali¬ 
fied  voters. 

TEXAS.  CONSTITUTION  OF  1876. 

The  House  is  apportioned  according  to  population.  The  Senate  con¬ 
sists  of  31  members  and  no  county  may  have  more  than  one  senator.  There 
are  253  counties,  of  which  but  4  have  as  much  as  the  full  ratio;  the  two 
largest  have  1.3  and  1.4  ratios  respectively.  The  rule  involves  no  dis¬ 
crimination. 


30 


UTAH.  CONSTITUTION  OF  1895. 

The  House  may  not  exceed  90  in  number  and  each  of  the  29  counties 
must  have  at  least  one  member.  This  rule  involves  no  serious  discrim¬ 
ination.  The  Senate  is  apportioned  according  to  population. 

VERMONT.  CONSTITUTION  OF  1793. 

The  House  consists  of  one  member  from  each  inhabited  town,  of  which 
there  are  about  250.  Upon  a  population  basis  the  27  largest  towns  would 
be  entitled  to  about  105  members,  instead  of  their  27.  Here  the  discrimina¬ 
tion,  which  has  been  accentuated  by  the  decline  in  the  population  of  most 
of  the  towns,  is  quite  severe. 

The  Senate  consists  of  not  more  than  30  members,  and  each  of  the  14 
counties  must  have  at  least  1.  But  only  one  county  has  less  than  a  full 
ratio,  and  only  two  counties  each  lose  a  senator  to  which  fractional  sur¬ 
pluses  would  otherwise  entitle  them.  There  is  no  substantial  discrimina¬ 
tion  here. 


VIRGINIA.  CONSTITUTION  OF  1902. 

No  rule  of  apportionment  is  laid  down  by  the  constitution. 

WASHINGTON.  CONSTITUTION  OF  1889. 

Both  the  House  and  Senate  are  apportioned  according  to  population. 

WEST  VIRGINIA.  CONSTITUTION  OF  1872. 

The  House  may  have  as  many  members  as  the  Legislature  may  fix,  and 
any  county  having  less  than  3/5  of  the  representative  ratio  may  be  attached 
to  a  contiguous  county.  For  some  years  each  county  has  had  at  least  one 
member,  but  no  real  discrimination  need  result. 

The  Senate  is  apportioned  according  to  population. 

WISCONSIN.  CONSTITUTION  OF  1848— AMENDED  1910  AS  TO  HOUSE. 

Both  the  House  and  Senate  are  apportioned  according  to  population. 

WYOMING.  CONSTITUTION  OF  1889. 

House  and  Senate  may  have  as  many  members  as  the  legislature  may 
determine,  so  long  as  each  county  is  given  one  senator  and  one  representa¬ 
tive,  and  the  House  is  not  less  than  twice  nor  more  than  three  times  as 
numerous  as  the  Senate. 


,137  BARNARD  &  MILLER  PRINT,  CHICAGO. 


